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STATE ACTION AND DISCRIMINATORY USE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN CIVIL TRIALS:
EDMONSON V. LEESVILZLE CONCRETE CO.*
I. INTRODUCTION

Excluding blacks from juries reflects one form of racial discrimination
in America. As early as 1880, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from statutorily barring blacks
from eligibility for jury service.' Today, although no formal
discrimination is allowed in selecting the jury pool, racial bias still works

in one way or another during the voir dire.
The peremptory challenge, 2 which affords counsel the right to strike
a juror without assigning any reason, has been held by some to be "one
of the most important ...rights secured to the accused" 3 to assure a fair
and impartial jury. Nevertheless, the use of peremptory challenges plays

an important part in keeping racial discrimination in the jury-selection
process.4 When attorneys make decisions about jurors, they often lack

@ Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Law Review.
* The author would like to express her gratitude to Jane Malmo for her invaluable
help.
1. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
2. Attorneys may make two kinds of challenges during juror voir dire: "for cause"
and peremptory. A challenge "for cause" requires judicial approval and that there be a
"narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of [a juror's] partiality."
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Challenges "for cause" are unlimited. See
Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire:Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 546-50 (1970). A peremptory challenge, on the other hand, is "arbitrary and
capricious" and historically can be exercised for any reason or no reason at all. See
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Peremptory challenges are limited in number. In civil trials in
federal court, each party is entitled to three peremptory challenges. See 28 U.S.C. §
1870 (1988). For a discussion of the history of peremptory challenges, see Swain, 380
U.S. at 214-17; JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 282-84 (1977);
Douglas L. Colbert, Challengingthe Challenge:ThirteenthAmendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges,76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9-12 (1991).
3. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
4. See Clara L. Meek, Note, The Use of Peremptory Challengesto Exclude Blacks
from Petit Juries in Civil Actions: The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, 4 REv.
Lro. 175 (1984).
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particularized information about the individuals drawn from the jury
pool. 5 Consequently, they tend to act on the basis of stereotypes and
presumptions. Peremptory challenges allow attorneys to act out their
unconscious or hidden prejudices in choosing a jury, a practice that
sometimes results in excluding a class of people based on race.'
Recognizing the injustice and impropriety in the use of peremptory
challenges, the Supreme Court gradually has limited the extent to which
peremptory challenges can be used to exclude potential jurors on account
of their race. In 1986, the Court in Batson v. Kentucky7 held that the
prosecutor's race-based use of peremptory challenges violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment! The Batson Court did
not, however, discuss the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges nor the possible application of this ruling to civil actions. 9
Can private attorneys in civil trials peremptorily strike potential jurors
based on their race without violating the Fourteenth Amendment? The
answer to the question depends on whether the private attorney's conduct
falls within state action, which is a prerequisite for any cause of action
under the Fourteenth Amendment."0 The Batson decision bans the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors who, as
members of the executive branch of government in criminal proceedings,
are state actors." Therefore, the primary roadblock to extending Batson
to a private litigant's attorney's use of peremptory challenges in civil trials
has been the question of state action.' 2 Since Batson, several federal
5. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Juy Verdicts, 56 U. Cmi. L. Rnv. 153, 211
(1989).

6. See id. at 211; Robert M. O'Connell, Note, The Elimination ofRacismfrom Jury
Selection: Challengingthe PeremptoryChallenge, 32 B.C. L. REV. 433, 439-53 (1991).
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. See id. at 89.
9. In 1989, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case that would have allowed

the Court to decide whether the Eleventh Circuit properly extended Batson to civil
actions. See Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Tiller v. Fludd, 493

U.S. 872 (1989). Justice White dissented and addressed the need to resolve this important
issue. See Tiller at 901 (White, J., dissenting).
10. See JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrtUTONAL LAW § 14.1
(4th ed. 1992).
11. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
12. For a detailed discussion of the state-action doctrine, see infra part III.A.
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and scholars have taken up the
courts have ruled differently on this issue,
13
debate along the same divided lines.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., " the Supreme Court
decided that a private attorney's use of discriminatory challenges in a civil
trial constituted "state action" for the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause. 5 The Court extended the Batson rule to civil trials by adopting

a liberal interpretation of the state-action principle. 6 Applying the Lugar

v. Edmonson Oil Co.17 state-action test, the Court found sufficient State

involvement in the private litigants' use of peremptory challenges that
private attorneys acted as state actors in striking down potential jurors in

the jury-selection process.18

This comment focuses on whether a private attorney's use of

peremptory challenges constitutes state action. For this purpose, Part II
briefly describes the background ofEdmonson. Part MII examines the state-

action principle and its application in the use of peremptory challenges in
civil cases. Part IV analyzes the Edmonson Court's majority and dissenting

opinions. Although this comment supports the Court's conclusion, it
disputes some of the Court's reasoning. It argues that the Court should
13. Some courts applying Batson have found that the state's involvement in the civil
jury-selection process demonstrates sufficient "state action" for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes. See Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990); Fludd,
863 F.2d at 822; Clark v. Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986); Lee Goldman,
Toward a Colorblind Jury Selection Process: Applying the "Batson Function" to
Peremptory Challenges in Civil Trials, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 147 (1990); Gerard
G. Brew, Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A
FurtherLook at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenges, 40 RUToERs L. REv. 891,
949-55 (1988); Comment, Recent Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 586, 586-91 (1989);
O'Connell, supra note 6; David Pork, Comment, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Company Inc.: Can the "No State Action" Shibboleth Legitimize the Racist Use of
Peremptory Challenges in Civil Action, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 271 (1990). Other
courts and commentators have concluded that Batson should not apply to civil actions.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'ggranted
en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Esposito v.
Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986); Timothy Patton, The DiscriminatoryUse
of Peremptory Challengesin CivilLitigation: Practice, Procedureand Review, 19 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 921, 929-30 (1988); David Kaston, Note, Vitiation of Peremptory
Challenge in Civil Actions: Clarkv. City of Bridgeport, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 155, 164
(1986); Eric Katz, Note, Striking the PeremptoryChallengefrom Civil Litigation: "Hey
Batson, Stay Where You Belong!," 11 PACE L. REv. 357 (1991).
14. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
15.
16.
17.
18.

See id. at 2080.
See id.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
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base its decision on the totality of the circumstances-specifically, by
weighing and balancing factors such as the courts' involvement in the
whole jury-selection process, the delegation of selecting a jury to the
private litigant, and the public's perception of the courts' enforcement of
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.19

II. EDMONSON V. LEESvILE CONCRETE CO.: THE CASE HISTORY
The plaintiff in this case, Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, sued defendant
Leesville Concrete Company for personal injuries arising from
construction work. The trial took place in the District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana. During voir dire, defendant's counsel
used two of his three peremptory challenges to remove prospective black
jurors.2 1 Edmonson, who was black, objected to the challenges. Relying
on Batson, Edmonson's counsel requested that the court require the
defendant to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
strikes.' The district court refused Edmonson's request on the ground
that Batson did not apply to civil proceedings.' Of the twelve jurors
impaneled, eleven were white and one was black. The verdict rendered
was unfavorable to the plaintiff.'
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed and held
that a private litigant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
violated equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments [Ednonson 1].' Edmonson I was the first post19. See discussion infra parts V-VI.

20. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., No. 6:84-2871 (W.D. La. Sept. 28,
1987), 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th 1990),
rev'd 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
21. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.

22. See id. In Batson, the court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial

group; (2) the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove venire members of the
defendant's race; and (3) the facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of
racial discrimination by the prosecutor. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Once a prima facie
case is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with race-neutral
reasons to explain his or her use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 98. This race-neutral
explanation must relate "to the particular case to be tried" and may not rest upon general
claims of good faith in making individual selections. Id. at 97-98.
23. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
24. See id. Thejury rendered a $90,000 verdict for Edmonson, but attributed 80%
of the fault to his contributory negligence, thus leaving him only $18,000. See id.
25. See Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh 'g
granted en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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Batson civil case that did not involve a state entity as one of the parties. 2
One month after the decision was issued, the Fifth Circuit granted an
en bane rehearing of the case.' The en bane court restored the jury
verdict, holding that the Batson rule could not be extended to compel

private litigants to explain their use of peremptory challenges in a federal
civil trial [Edmonson ll].

The Edmonson I court based its decision on

lack of state action.'
On June 3, 1991, the Supreme Court reversed the en bane circuit
court opinion by holding that the exercise of peremptory challenges in this
civil action was pursuant to a course of state action and was therefore
subject to constitutional requirements.' Justice O'Connor dissented,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia; ' she argued that a

State could not be held responsible for private parties' discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges in civil actions.'
separate dissent. 33

Justice Scalia also filed a

I. STATE-ACTION PRINCIPLE: PRIVATE PARTIES'
USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

A. State Action
The Constitution's protection of individual liberty and equality applies

only to action by the government;' thus racial discrimination, no matter
how odious, violates the Constitution only when attributable to state
26. O'Connell, supra note 6, at 434, 460 (noting that pre-Batson cases were all
federal civil-rights suits involving government agents or entities). See Fludd v. Dykes,
863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir.) (defendant was county sheriff), cert. denied, Tiller v.
Fludd, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1988)
(defendants were police officers); Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill.),
vacatedsub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988) (one defendantwas
a mayor and one was a police commissioner); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp.
890, 890 (D. Conn. 1986) (defendant was a police officer); O'Connell, supra note 6, at
434 n.7.
27. See Edmonson 1, 895 F.2d at 1308.
28. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 226 (5th Cir. 1990)
(en bane), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
29. See id. at 221-22. For a detailed discussion of the Edmonson decisions, see
O'Connell, supra note 6, at 460-84, and discussion infra part III.
30. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
31. See id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
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action.3' Although a private attorney's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges unfairly may work toward the exclusion of a minority from a
jury, a party must show state action to invoke the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The state-action principle finds its roots 100 years ago in the so-called
Civil Rights Cases,' in which the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to prohibit
discrimination by privately owned inns, conveyances, and places of
amusement.' According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
provided redress against racial discrimination only by "the operation of
State laws, and the action of State officers," not by private citizens.38
Although the state-action principle is easily defined, no bright line
separates "private action" from "state action," especially in cases
involving complicated interaction between private parties and the State.3"
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority," "to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of
state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible
task,'" 41 and "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance." 42 Over the course of history, the Court has articulated
several state-action "tests," such as the state-enforcement test,43 the
public-function test," and the significant-involvement and sufficientassistance tests.45 The Court has recognized, however, that these tests,
which are analyzed below, may represent nothing more than "different
ways of characterizing fact-bound [state-action] inquiry. "'
The Court set out the "state-enforcement" test in Shelley v.
Kraemer,4 7 in which it held that enforcing racially restrictive covenants
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
at 722);

See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See id. at 24.
Id. at 11.
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Id. at 722.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
See infra text accompanying notes 56-60.
Lugarv. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,939 (1982) (citing Burton, 365 U.S.
see infra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.

47. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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between private property owners by judicial officers in their capacities is

to be regarded as action of the State." In Shelley, a black purchaser

bought a house in a mostly white neighborhood in St. Louis, Missouri.1
A group of neighbors sued Shelley to block the sale based on a restrictive
covenant in the 1911 deed that banned the sale or lease of the property to
blacks or Mongolians.' The trial court upheld the validity of the
covenant.5" On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the racially
motivated private restrictive covenants did not, in and of themselves,

violate the Equal Protection Clause.52 But, when a state court enforced
such a covenant, the court became a state actor denying equal protection
to the objecting party.'

Under the "public-function" test, when a private party engages in an
"exclusively public function," his or her act may constitute state action.'

For example, under the Fifteenth Amendment, a State cannot exclude
blacks from voting by delegating to a private political organization the task
of determining the qualifications of voters.55
According to the "significant-involvement" test, state action exists
when sufficient contacts between the private party and the State show that
the private act is accomplished with significant governmental assistance or

that a "symbiotic relationship" exists between the private party and the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 14, 20.
Id. at 4-5.
See id. at 4-6.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 13.

53. See id. at 19-20.
54. The "delegation-of-a-public-function" test of state action originated in Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1946), and the White Primary Cases, including Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953),
which have been read as establishing that operating a town and running state and local
elections are "intrinsically governmental functions" and hence, constitute state action no
matter who performs them. See Paul Brest, State Action andLiberalTheory: A Casenote
on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1326 (1982).
55. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953). In Terry, a voluntary club of
white Texas Democrats-the Jay Bird Democratic Association-excluded blacks from
their pre-primary election, and the winner, with few exceptions, ran unopposed in the
primary. See id. at 463. The majority of justices, though writing separately, appeared to
agree that there was a delegation of public function to the club, which subjected the
club's practice to the Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 481, 484.
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State.m The extent of state activity in relation to the private party helps
determine whether the State, in an apparently neutral action, has in fact,

"significantly involved itself" in private discrimination.' For example,
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,5" a state-licensed private bar refused
to sell liquor to a black customer solely because of his race." The Court

held that the State's issuance of the liquor license was too attenuated to
support a finding of state action by the defendant and thus insufficient to
trigger sanctions against the defendant's discriminatory practice under the
Fourteenth Amendment. °
In the 1988 case of Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope,61

the Court offered yet another version of the substantial-assistance test. In
this case, Oklahoma's Probate Code provided that creditors' claims against
an estate are valid only if they are presented to the executor within certain
time limits. 62 The plaintiff failed to comply with these limits, and the
probate court denied its application for payment.' The Supreme Court
held that even though the private use of state probate procedures did not
necessarily rise to the level of state action, the probate court's intimate

involvement throughout the probate proceeding has been so pervasive and
substantial that it must be considered state action. 64
56. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961). In
Burton, the Court held that a privately owned restaurant that leased space in a
governmental parking facility violated the Equal Protection Clause in refusing service to
racial minorities. See id. at 721. State action was demonstrated because the State had
"not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but ha[d] elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id. at 725.
57. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). In Reitman, the Supreme Court
invalidated a California constitutional amendment guaranteeingproperty owners the right
to refuse to sell or rent their real property to anyone they choose. See id. at 371.
According to the Court, such an amendment would unconstitutionally involve the State
in, and place the State's sanction on, private-housing discrimination. See id. at 378-79.
58. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
59. Id. at 165.

60. See id. at 173-77.
61. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
62. See id. at 479-81.
63. See id. at 482.
64. See id. at 487.
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In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. Inc. ,' the Supreme Court formulated
a new two-part test for state action.' First, the violation must be the
result of the exercise of some privilege created and granted by the
state.67 Second, the party charged must be fairly described as a state
actor.' The Court listed three categories of people who would be
characterized as state actors: a governmental official; someone who has
acted together with or received significant help from state officials; or
someone whose conduct is otherwise attributable to the state.'
In retrospect, the Supreme Court has developed a variety of holdings
and theories on the state-action question, varying with the facts of the
cases before it. But, at the core of these tests lies a common question: is
the involvement of the State in the private conduct sufficiently significant
to hold the State responsible for the result of the private action?
B. State Action and Peremptory Challenges
Before the Edmonson decision, lower courts applied various stateaction tests to deal with private litigants' discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges in civil actions. Though focusing on the same factors, such as
state involvement and the judge's role in administering jury selection,
courts have arrived at different conclusions.' The Fifth Circuit's
Edmonson I majority coupled with the Edmonson II dissent, and the
Edmonson I dissent together with the en bane opinion in Edmonson II,
represent the two different applications of the state-action principle in the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
1. Edmonson I
The Edmonson I court, after thoroughly examining state-action
cases, 71 concluded that the case at hand involved more governmental
65. 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that a private creditor's joint participation with
governmental officials in state-created attachment proceedings made the creditor a state
actor).
66. See id. at 936-39.

67. Id. at 937, 939.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 937.
70. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
71. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1310-12 (5th Cir.
1988), reh'g granted en bane, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077
(1991).
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action than was deemed necessary to establish state action.' A State is
"intimately involved" in the entire jury-selection process, which includes
the use of peremptory challenges, because the government summons the
jurors, excuses the challenged jurors, and impanels the jury.7 Moreover,
peremptory challenges are authorized by statutes and are exercised in the
course of a judicial proceeding.74 Thus the state actor is the trial court
judge who, as both agent and officer, administers the peremptorychallenge procedure and gives it the final approval.75
Applying the Lugar two-part test, Judge Thomas Gee, who
dissented,76 found that the second part of the test was not satisfied: a
private litigant exercising peremptory challenges could not reasonably be
considered a state actor.' According to Judge Gee, the role of the court
in the exercise of peremptory challenges was "merely ministerial.""
2. Edmonson II
In Edmonson II, Judge Gee, this time writing for the en banc
majority, reiterated the arguments he advanced in Edmonson I 7 In
addition, he relied on Polk County v. Dodson,"° which held that a
government-paid public defender was not a state actor and therefore not
liable to her client under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act." By
extension, according to Judge Gee, the private attorney in the civil trial
served her client's interests only and not those of the State.'
72. See id. at 1312.
73. Id.
74. See id. The court found that "[t]he government is inevitably and inextricably
involved as an actor in the process by which a federal judge, robed in black, seated in
a paneled courtroom, in front of an American flag, says to a juror, 'Ms. X, you are
excused.'" Id. at 1313.
75. See id.
76. Id.at 1315 (Gee, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1315-16. For a discussion of the Lugar test, see supra text accompanying
notes 65-69.
78. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
79. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
80. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
81. Id. at 320.
82. See Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 222. The court also pointed out that if any state
interest was present in a civil trial, it was significantly lower than in a criminal case, and
that the private counsel in the civil action therefore could not be said to be advancing any
real governmental interest. See id.

1992]

COMMENT

Judge Rubin, writing in defense of his Edmonson I opinion, dissented
in Edmonson II.' He acknowledged that action pursuant to some statute,
with nothing more, did not satisfy the second prong of the Lugar test.4
"Something more" is needed to demonstrate state action, and the active
role played by the judge in the use of peremptory challenges provided that
"something."'

IV.

THE SUPREME COURT AND EDMONSON V.
LEESvLLE CONCRETE Co.

The Supreme Court's majority' and dissenting' opinions focused
on the same issue: whether the involvement of the court in the private
litigant's use of peremptory challenges is sufficiently significant to find
state action."
A. Majority Opinion
The majority of the Court, agreeing with the Edmonson I majority and
the Edmonson II dissent, held that in exercising peremptory challenges in
civil trials, private attorneys functioned as state actors.' In reaching its
conclusion, the Court applied the Lugar two-prong test,90 asking first,
whether the use of peremptory challenges had its source in state
authority,9 1 and second, whether the private attorney could be deemed to
be a state actor.' The first part of the test was easily satisfied because
the use of peremptory challenges had its source in statutes, and in this
case, the challenges were exercised pursuant to federal law.'
83. Id. at 227-38 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 229.
85. Id. at 232-33.
86. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2082-83.
87. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. The opinion also addressed the issue of standing, which is not discussed in this
comment. See id. at 2087.
89. Id. at 2084-85.
90. See id. at 2083.
91. See id. (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-41 (1982)).
92. See id.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988): "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to
three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered
as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additional
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly." Id.
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The Court found that the facts surrounding the use of peremptoiy
challenges in civil trials also satisfied the second part of the Lugar test."
Not only are peremptory challenges authorized by federal statute, the
majority argued,95 but also a private party uses peremptory challenges
with the overt, significant assistance of the government. Moreover,
because peremptory challenges are used in selecting a jury-an entity that
is a quintessential governmental body-choosing a jury involves the
performance of a traditional governmental function. 7 Furthermore, the
injury allegedly caused by the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
becomes aggravated in a unique way by the incidence of governmental
authority because judicial procedures represent the government's
constitutional authority."
B. Dissenting Opinions
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor disputed the majority opinion on the
extent of governmental involvement, as well as the nature of peremptory
challenges.' According to Justice O'Connor, the State's involvement was
not significant enough to find state action in the private litigant's use of
peremptory challenges;' °° no state enforcement figured in the excusing
of potential jurors after the exercise of peremptory challenges;01 and the
occurrence of discrimination within a courtroom could not turn a private
act into a state one. 1" Thus, for Justice O'Connor, the State should not
be held responsible for a private party's racially discriminatory use of
peremptories. 1°3
Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent addressing the negative effect
of the majority opinion on minority litigants." According to Justice
Scalia, the majority opinion, which logically must apply to defendants in
criminal prosecutions, would inevitably prevent minority defendants in a
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
Id. at 2084.
Id.
See id. at 2085.

98. See id. at 2087.
99. See id. at 2089-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2091 (citing Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,
487 (1988)).
101. Id. at 2091.
102. Id. at 2095.
103. See id. at 2084 (majority opinion).
104. See id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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criminal trial from using race-based strikes, thus depriving them of the
opportunity to avoid having an all-white jury. 5 Moreover,
administering the rule would inevitably add cost to the already
overburdened justice system."° Currently, all litigants may lodge racialchallenge objections, and after the denial of an objection, appeal this
denial-with the consequence of possibly overturning the judgment. "
V. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Edmonson applied the
Lugar test, but they reached different conclusions about whether a private
litigant's discriminatory striking down of potential jurors can be
reasonably considered state action. 8 On a fundamental level, the
majority and dissent register different understandings about the impact of
peremptory challenges in the jury-selection process. As a result, the
majority and dissenting justices disagreed on nearly all of the other issues
they considered in determining the issue of state action: whether the extent
of the court's involvement is significant; whether the State had enforced
private discrimination by allowing the removal of potential jurors based
on their race; whether the exercise of peremptory challenges constituted
a performance of a public function; and whether the State should be held
responsible for discrimination within the courthouse. "
When the State's role is concerned, the majority asserted, there is a
necessity to step in and address racial bias in the legal system." 0 The
dissenting justices stressed the State's limited role, insisting that a more
impartial jury would result if the private litigants were allowed to interact
with each other free from state interference."'
The majority's finding of state action may be justified, based on the
totality of the circumstances around a private party's use of peremptory
challenges in civil trials. When taken separately, any of the circumstances
involved would not be enough to find the State responsible for the private
attorney's use of peremptory challenges. When taken together, however,
the aggregate effect warrants a finding of state action. In balancing all of
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2095-96.
107. See id. at 2096.
108. See id. at 2082-83 (majority opinion); id. at 2089-93 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
109. See id. at 2081 (majority opinion); id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 2088 (majority opinion).
111. See id. at 2089-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2095-96 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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the factors, we should recognize that some factors are more important than
others and thus should carry more weight. For example, the status of the
peremptory challenges as an integral part of the jury-selection process
contributes heavily to the finding of state action in the private attorney's
conduct. The jury-selection process not only provides the larger context
in which private parties exercise peremptory challenges, but also underlies
the significant state involvement in, and the harm resulting from, the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Moreover, the totality-ofcircumstances approach rejects a purely procedural analysis of the use of
peremptory challenges. Instead, it assigns significant weight to (1) the
excluded jurors' perception of a private party's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges, and (2) the harm to the excluded potential jurors
and the public's confidence in the jury-selection process resulting from
such use.
A. Court Involvement in the Peremptory Challenges
Both sides of the Court agreed that a private party's exercise of a
state-created right or privilege does not, by itself, amount to state
action.112 But the consensus ended there.
The majority asserted that the court's involvement, through the courtadministered jury-selection procedure and the presiding judge, made the
113
private attorneys' use of peremptory challenges state action.
According to the majority, peremptory challenges have no utility outside
11 4
the jury system, which is administered solely by the government.
Congress prescribed jury qualifications and jury-selection procedures:1 5
the courts all adopt procedures to implement these statutes;"1 trial
lawyers get information about prospective jurors from the court;11 7 and
112. See id. at 2083-84 (majority opinion); id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (noting that "private
parties [should not] face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state
rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them"); Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 162-64 (1978) (finding that a proposed sale of a debtor's stored
goods by a private warehouseman was not state action even though the warehouseman
was acting pursuant to a state statute).
113. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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potential jurors are summoned by the court and receive a per diem wage
fixed by statute for their services."'
In addition, the majority argued that the trial judge exercises
substantial control over the voir dire and participates in the exercise of
peremptory challenges." 9 The trial judge affects the exercise of
peremptory challenges and for-cause challenges because of his or her
ultimate role in the process. The judge may conduct the entire voir dire
himself or herself, decide the range of information disclosed to attorneys
about the potential jurors, oversee the exclusion of jurors for cause and
thus determine which jurors remain eligible for the use of peremptories,
and excuse a juror upon the exercise of a peremptory strike. 12'
In opposition, Justice O'Connor argued that the governmental
administration of the jury-selection system was independent of private
attorneys' use of peremptory challenges."' According to Justice
O'Connor, while all other procedures concerning the jury selection were
wholly administered by the State, attorneys were specifically given full
discretion to exercise peremptory challenges. 12 Moreover, the judge
does no more than acquiesce in the private decision to strike potential
jurors; thus the judge's excusing the juror does not amount to state
participation in the use of peremptory challenges." z Therefore, the juryselection system cannot involve sufficient state involvement in the private
attorneys' use of peremptory challenges so as to constitute state
action. "
A court's administration of the jury-selection process, though
providing a framework for the use of peremptory challenges, by itself
does not provide sufficient state involvement to justify a finding of state
action. The particular character of peremptory challenges in the juryselection scheme must be taken into account. As Justice O'Connor stated,
peremptory challenges differ from other statutory provisions concerning
the jury-selection process, such as jury pooling, because a private litigant
is allowed to strike any potential juror "without a reason stated, without
injury and without being subject to the court's control."" z Therefore,
society must find a balance between the unique character of peremptory
challenges and the statutory scheme of the jury-selection process.
118. Id.
119. See id.

120. Id.
121. See id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2092.
123. Id. at 2090.
124. Id. at 2091.
125. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
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The special nature of the peremptory challenge determines a judge's
role in the statutory scheme in which the challenges are exercised.
Statutory provisions usually specify only the number of peremptory
challenges available for each side, not the manner in which the challenges
are to be exercised or jurors excused. " Consequently, the judge is
expected to refrain from interfering in the litigants' decisions to
peremptorily strike jurors. The judge's function after the exercise of
peremptory challenges is simply to excuse the venire member from the
courthouse. " Therefore, in the sense that no judgment or discretion is
required of the judge, his or her role in the use of peremptory challenges
serves a mere ministerial function." Given this "minimal" involvement,
a trial judge does not convert the private use of peremptory challenges into
state action. 129
The point can be further explained when we consider how the judge
rules on objections regarding a party's use of peremptory challenges.
When an attorney uses a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror,
the opposing attorney may object based on Batson. Upon an objection, the
judge must first decide whether such use constitutes state action before
ruling on any possible violation under the Fourteenth Amendment."3" In
determining whether state action is present, the judge must look at the
attorney's decision to strike the prospective juror, not what the judge
would do in response to the objection.131 The judge's ruling on the
objection is, of course, state action, but he or she does not participate in
an attorney's decision to discriminate. The court's ruling comes only after
the attorney has already used such challenges. 1' 2 Therefore, the judge
does not participate in private attorneys' exercise of peremptory
challenges. Accordingly, the judge cannot provide the element of state
authority needed to rule on the state-action question in the attorney's use
of peremptory challenges."
126. See VAN DYKE, supranote 2, at 318-19.
127. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2091 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2090.
129. See Katz, supra note 13, at 399.
130. See R. George Wright, Litigating the State Action Issue in Peremptory
Challenge Cases, 13 AM. J.TmL ADvoc. 573, 582-83 (1989).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
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B. "Exclusive" or "Traditional" Public Function?
Applying the public-function test, the majority argued that peremptory
challenges involve the performance of a traditional governmental function

that attributes state action to the private attorneys' conduct. " The
private attorneys exercise governmental power when they use peremptory
challenges to select a jury, which is a quintessential governmental
body.'35 The governmental function of peremptory challenges in the

jury-selection process is one of the most significant factors that the Court
considered in determining the issue of state action in Edmonson.
In holding that the private attorney became a government actor for the
limited purpose of using peremptory challenges during the selection
process," the Court distinguished the public defender in Polk County
v. Dodson'3 7 from private attorneys who use peremptory challenges.
According to the Court, the relationship between the public defender and

government in the criminal trial is adversarial, whereas in the juryprocess, "the government and private litigants work for the same
selection
38
end."1
Rejecting the majority's interpretation of the public-function doctrine,

Justice O'Connor argued that the doctrine requires not only "traditional
government function" but also that the private actor exercise "a power
'traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." "1 39 Under this test to
find state action, the private conduct must comprise something that
134. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 2086.
137. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
138. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
139. Id. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Jacksonv. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). The disagreement over the public-function doctrine is
not new. In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), Justice Rehnquist articulated
the "exclusive" governmental-function test and held that the delegation of power to
resolve disputes between debtors and creditors did not involve a delegation of "an
exclusive prerogative of the sovereign." Id. at 160. Justice Stevens contested the Court's
view in Flagg Bros. on the exclusivity of the public function. For him, the inquiry was
"whether the State has delegated a function traditionally and historically associated with
sovereignty." Id. at 171 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, he argued, the power to
order a binding, non-consensual resolution of a conffict between private parties is a
public function, and the state delegation of that power to a private party is, accordingly,
state action. Id. at 176. The state action in Flagg Bros. came not from the clerk's
ministerial role in signing the order, but from the "State's role in defining and
controlling the debtor-creditor relationship." Id. at 173-74.
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traditionally only the government does." But, "it has never been
exclusively the function of the government to select juries; peremptory
strikes are older than the Republic." 14 1 Therefore, Justice O'Connor
concluded, the use of peremptory challenges did not qualify as an
exclusive governmental function.142
For Justice O'Connor, Polk County v. Dodson'" was controlling.
If a public defender-on public payroll-did not become a state actor in
the courtroom, then neither could an attorney who was hired by the
private litigant.1" Disputing the majority's opinion, Justice O'Connor
asserted that private attorneys in civil trials did not work for the same end
as the government. 1" Instead, because attorneys representing clients on
opposite sides are in an adversarial relation, they use peremptory
challenges in direct opposition to one another and for precisely contrary
ends. 14
Justice O'Connor has taken peremptory challenges out of context.
While peremptory challenges may be older than the Republic, they now
operate only in the jury-selection process, and only the government
traditionally has run the judicial system for its people.'
Moreover, the jury-selection process is a public function.
Consequently, the attorneys' exercise of peremptory challenges can be
deemed a state function delegated to private administration, analogous to
the privately controlled state election.'" That peremptory challenges are
exercised by private litigants cannot change the governmental nature of the
jury-selection system. Instead, the governmental nature of the juryselection system makes peremptory challenges part of a public function.
Furthermore, Dodson cannot preclude a finding of state action in the
private attorney's use of peremptory challenges. 49 What Dodson stands
for is that public defenders are accredited with the same independent
decisionmaking in their representation of clients that privately retained
140.
141.
142.
143.

Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id.
454 U.S. 312 (1981); see supranotes 80-81 and accompanying text.
144. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2094 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 2086.
146. Id. at 2095.
147. See id. at 2085.
148. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,469-70 (1953); see also O'Connell, supra
note 6, at 474 n.364 (analogizing private attorneys to a corporation in a highly regulated
business).
149. See Ednonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
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lawyers are."S Further, the Court in Dodson did not rule out the
possibility that a public defender could be a state actor in other

contexts."' For instance, the public defender can function as a state
actor when performing administrative or investigative functions on behalf
of the state.152

Finally, the Supreme Court has equated exclusion from participation
in juries with denial of the elective franchise, in that the exclusion from
a jury denies access to an important citizen-participation function."
More importantly, the misuse of peremptory challenges involves racial
discrimination, requiring heightened judicial scrutiny and increased

vigilance against violations."

Thus, it makes sense to hold that the

exclusion of potential jurors as a result of racially based peremptory
challenges violates the excluded jurors' constitutional rights protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. State Enforcement of Peremptory Challenges and State
Responsibility: The Analogy to Shelley v. Kraemer
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the government may not, by
legislative or judicial action, give effect to private prejudices. 55 In

Edmonson, the Court concluded that "[b]y enforcing a discriminatory...
challenge, the court 'has not only made itself a party to the [biased act],

but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
[alleged] discrimination. ' ' 1

Therefore, the State "in a significant way

has involved itself with invidious discrimination.""
150. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 318-19.
151. See id. at 324-25.
152. See id. at 325.
153. See id.
154. Id.; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding
that strict scrutiny is required to examine classifications based on race); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-09 (1879) (holding that a state statute excluding blacks from
juries is unconstitutional).
155. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431, 433 (1984) (invalidating a Florida
decision denying a white woman custody of her child because she was living with a black
man); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that courts may not enforce
private covenants that discriminate on the basis of race).
156. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
356 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
157. Id.
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The arguments favoring a finding of state action based on state
enforcement usually rely heavily on Shelley v. Kraemer. 5' The majorit1
opinion, however, did not cite Shelley extensively on this point. i
Because the Court did not characterize the judge's excusing the venire
member as an enforcement of private discrimination, the Court apparently
did not want to draw an analogy to Shelley."1W
Justice O'Connor's dissent tried to distinguish Shelley from the case
at hand.' In Shelley, the court used coercive power to force private
parties to discriminate. 62 But in this case, according to Justice
O'Connor, the peremptory challenges were voluntary in nature and were
exercised at the complete discretion of the private litigants without the

control of the court. 11 As the Supreme Court in Blum v. Yaretsky t"

noted, "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision

only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement . . . that the choice must . . . be deemed that of the

State."" The coercive power recognized in Shelley was also a factor in
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,

in which the state's judicial system was

used to attach the debtor's property in an attachment proceeding.167
But Justice O'Connor failed to take into account that the formal

authority of the court was invoked by a private litigant's peremptory
discharge of venire members." Although no "coercive power" is
158. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1. For a detailed discussion of the case, see text
accompanying supranotes 47-53.
159. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080-89.
160. See id. at 2084-85 (characterizing the action as an exercise of a traditional
government function having no attributes of a private actor).
161. See id. at 2090-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 2091 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a
Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a
Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 819 (1989).
163. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2091 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
165. Id. at 1004. The Fifth Circuit's Edmonson decision referred to this passage.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
166. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
167. See id. at 924-25. An attachment proceeding is a state-sanctioned means of
acquiring the property of another to satisfy a debtor or to pressure a debtor into finding
an alternate means to meet a creditor's demands. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 126
(6th ed. 1990).
168. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
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involved in the procedure," the result of the peremptory challenge is
to dismiss the potential juror and change the final composition of the jury.
Moreover, to the extent that the potential jurors may not know that it is
the private attorney, and not the court, who has excluded them from the
jury service,' it can be said that the court has made itself17a1 part of the
discrimination "[b]y enforcing a discriminatory challenge."
Some critics also argue that peremptory challenges differ from the
restrictive covenants in Shelley, which were explicitly discriminatory.'1
Peremptory challenges are at least facially neutral, whereas the court in
Shelley enforced discriminatory covenants on parties who did not want to
discriminate." 3 Ample evidence shows, however, that peremptory
challenges are frequently used for discriminatory purposes to the extent
that their use cannot be characterized as neutral in nature.' 74

Furthermore, the discriminatory application of facially neutral statutes has

been found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.' 75 Simultaneously, the

courts are often seen as supporting the private attorney's discriminatory

practices.' 76 As a result, an element of state enforcement is involved in

private attorneys' use of peremptory challenges, and this element helps
support a finding of state action.
D. DiscriminationWithin the Courthouse: Perception of Unfairness?

The Edmonson majority stressed that the effect of discrimination is
odious because the discriminatory practices occurred within court
169. Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. See infra notes 181-83.
171. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085. The Court discussed this in the context of the
role of the judge in the use of peremptory challenges and found that "[w]ithout the direct
and indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the
peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose." Id.
172. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13; see also Louis H. Pollak, RacialDiscrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-14
(1959) (arguing that although the Fourteenth Amendment allows each citizen his or her
personal prejudices, it bars access to state aid to induce others to conform with those
prejudices).
173. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 6-7; THOMAs A. MALE, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 29 (1989); JOSEPH R. NoLAN, TRIAL PRACrICE 53 (1981); VAN DYKE,
supranote 2, at 145-51; Goldwasser, supranote 162, at 819 (stating that the peremptory
challenges are facially neutral because the challenged jurors are identified by name or
assigned number and the challenges are exercised pursuant to neutral statutes or rules).
174. See Meek, supra note 4, at 213-15.
175. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
176. See infra notes 181-83.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

proceedings." 7 The racially biased use of peremptory challenges
damages the public's confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.178
The dissent, agreeing that discrimination in a courtroom was "particularly
abhorrent," nevertheless argued that the state was not responsible for
every inequitable act. 17 While the majority emphasized fairness in the
justice system, the dissent downplayed the court's role in the battle for
equality and non-discrimination by referring to the courtroom as "a forum
established by the government for the resolution of dispute." 1"'
The dissent's reasoning on this point fails to consider fully the effect
of perceived unfairness resulting from the exclusion of potential jurors
based on their race. When the venire members are excused after the
peremptory strikes, they most likely do not know why they were excused
or who was responsible for their discharge."8 "In such cases, the
'inference is inescapable to both the excluded jurors and the public' that
the state is responsible for the jurors' exclusion. " " Whether the law
recognizes judicial acquiescence as state action, much of the public
perceives it as having judicial approval. 1" Thus, in the public's eye, the
court is inextricably involved in the private use of peremptory challenges.
As a result, the effect of the strike on venire members and the public at
large helps to attribute state action to private litigants' use of peremptory
challenges.
Such a perceived relationship between the court and the private litigant
in the use of peremptory challenges can constitute a "symbiotic
relationship,""' as articulated by the Court in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority. "sIn Burton, a restaurant leased its space from a state
parking facility."' Even though the government did not encourage the
restaurant's private discriminatory practice, the Court found a sufficient
presence of state authority in the landlord-tenant relationship and the
177. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. See generally Goldman, supra note 13, at 187-88 (stating that in some
jurisdictions challenges are made and ruled upon outside the presence of the jury).
182. Id. at 165 (quoting People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1245 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990)). "Though in some cases counsels' questions during the
voir dire may suggest which litigant chooses to challenge the excluded juror." Id.

183. Id.
184. See Goldman, supra note 13, at 168.
185. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
186. Id. at 716.
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location of the restaurant to find state action. 1 The same can be said
of the relationship between the court and the private litigant in the
courtroom, in which the private use of peremptory challenges is carried
out within the legal system.
Therefore, even though the serious harm inflicted on the excluded
jurors and the public may not be enough to attribute state action to the
private parties who discriminate based on race, it adds weight to the
cumulative effects that would finally warrant a finding of state action.
E. State Action as a Result of Aggregate Effect?:
A Balancing Approach
Although this comment shows some of the flaws in the majority's
reasoning in Edmonson, it supports the finding of state action in a private
attorney's use of peremptory challenges. It advocates a balancing
approach, however, that stresses the totality of circumstances. The
Supreme Court already used this approach in Burton when it tried to
ascertain state involvement in the private act by "sifting facts and
weighing circumstances.""'
Under this balancing approach, the Court should not evaluate each
factor in the abstract or isolated from the others. For example, it would
be a mistake to stress only the special character of peremptory challenges
as an enclave preserved for private choice, without giving due regard to
the whole jury-selection process.
Therefore, although peremptory challenges are a distinctive part of the
jury-selection process, the Court should weigh the following factors: (1)
the courts' administration of the jury-selection process; (2) the delegation
to the private attorneys of the power to choose an impartial jury through
exercising peremptory challenges; (3) the perception of the courts'
involvement in and enforcement of private discrimination through the use
of peremptory challenges; and (4) the harm to the public, litigants, and the
excluded potential jurors resulting from discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. Standing alone, none of the factors elevate a private party's
use of peremptory challenges to state action. But, these factors in the
aggregate justify a finding of state action.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

Supreme Court decisions, from Strauder v. West Virginia" through
Edmonson, show not only the Court's commitment to racial equality, but
187. See id. at 720-26.
188. Id. at 722; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
189. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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more importantly, the difficulty in achieving the goal of racial
equality. 1"' It is still hard to predict whether the Court's decision in
Edmonson, though admirable, actually will eliminate such bias from the
justice system. Justice Scalia argued in his separate dissent that limiting
the use of peremptory challenges would have negative consequences

because it would burden not only the court system but the minority
litigants as well. 19' Justice Scalia's opinion thus raises several concerns

about the future of peremptory challenges in the jury-selection
process."
It is likely that Edmonson will increase the number of appeals in
which the racial-challenge objections have been denied." 9 The resulting
burden on the court system can be justified, however, given the
fundamental rights that may be infringed in the misuse of peremptory

challenges,"

litigants," 9

the damage done to potential black jurors and

and the need to preserve the fairness of the judicial

system."9 In any event, the Court's decision may not provide the best
way to eliminate racial discrimination in the jury-selection process.

Extending Batson to civil trials entails the difficult challenge of
determining when a prima facie case of discrimination exists in the use of

peremptory challenges." 9 Just as a prosecutor can easily assert "neutral"

190. See, e.g., Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077,2081 (1991);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (holding that the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from serving on juries in criminal cases is
unconstitutional); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965) (holding that a jury
pool that does not accurately reflect the percentages of groups in a community is not per
se violative of the Constitution).
191. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 2095 (noting that peremptory challenges are sometimes used to
assure racially diverse juries, instead of preventing them).
193. Shortly after the Batson decision, hundreds of appeals were filed. See William
Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 SuP. CT.
REV. 97, 155 (noting that the Court's decision in Batson greatly contributes to the
expenses-both in time and money-of the American criminal justice system and that the
Court's decision "open[s] up a new vista of delicate hearings and fascinating legal issues
that will occupy courts for years to come").
194. See E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Note, Discriminationby the Defense: Peremptory
ChallengesAfter Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUm. L. REv. 355, 363 (1988).
195. See id. at 359.
196. See id. at 368.
197. See Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Ha!f'Step in the Right
Direction, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1026, 1036-38 (1987) (noting that a prosecutor can so
easily rebut a prima facie case that the Court's equal protection guarantees are illusory).
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reasons for his or her strikes, 1 counsel in civil actions can also come
up with a facially neutral explanation for his or her use of peremptory

challenges. 1" Moreover, "the trial courts are ill equipped to secondguess those reasons."'
The difficulty in detecting discrimination and deterring the

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges led Justice Marshall to
advocate complete abolition of peremptory challenges."' This position

has been supported by scholars and commentators,'

some of whom

also have argued that the use of peremptory challenges is not essential to
an impartial jury and a fair trial.'
The use of peremptory challenges is not guaranteed by the

Constitution;'

hence, it can be eliminated or fundamentally reformed

to curtail discriminatory use.' Moreover, because litigants can still
strike prospective jurors for cause,' eliminating peremptory challenges
would not significantly affect private litigants' rights to choose a jury.

Meanwhile, the post-Ednwnson requirement that upon objection, an
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See Meek, supra note 4, at 211.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See id. at 108.
202. See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 167-69 (noting that "[tihis idea is
offered cautiously because good reasons exist for giving the defense peremptories");
Alschuler, supra note 5, at 199-211 (arguing that peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional); Sean Chapman, Comment, Batson v. Kentucky. A Signyficant Step
Toward EliminatingDiscriminationin the Jury Selection Process,29 ARIZ. L. REV. 697,
702 (1987) (asserting that peremptory challenges should be eliminated because they
maintain "the possibility of discrimination in the jury selection process"); Dunnigan,
supranote 194, at 365-68 (arguing in favor of limiting the defendant's and prosecution's
peremptory challenges); Mintz, supra note 197, at 1026 (urging the elimination of
peremptory challenges to "make the constitutional safeguards of potential minority jurors
and minority defendants ... a workable reality").
203. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 5, at 203 (arguing that use of peremptory
challenges by attorneys was not accurate in eliminating jurors who would disfavor their
position); Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of PeremptoryChallengeson Jury
and Verdict: An Experiment in FederalDistrict Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 513-18
(1978) (discussing an experiment conducted by the authors, which showed little
correlation between prospective jurors eliminated through peremptory challenges and
those prospective jurors voting against the attorney who made the challenge).
204. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (finding that "there is
nothing in the Constitution . . . which requires Congress [or the States] to grant
peremptory challenges").
205. Katz, supra note 13, at 403-08.
206. Id. at 407.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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attorney should provide a race-neutral explanation for his or her use of
peremptory challenges has blurred the distinction between challenges for
cause and peremptory challenges.'
Notably, the restriction on the use of peremptory challenges will affect
the minority litigant's use of them to strike potential jurors to assemble a
favorable jury. It is worth the price, however, for minority attorneys to
give up peremptory challenges so as to eliminate the harm done by the
discriminatory challenges in the jury-selection process.' Discrimination
still exists in the jury process in both the criminal and civil contexts,'
and the harm done by the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is
as severe in civil actions as in criminal proceedings."' Even the
dissenting Justices in Edmonson recognized the existence of discrimination
as well as211the harm caused by the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.
The Edmonson decision represents the general tendency of Supreme
Court decisions to consistently broaden the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment protection guaranteed to those involved in the judicial
process. 212 One year after Edmonson, the Supreme Court took a further
step to prohibit a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges in Georgia v.
McCollum."3 As a result, no litigant, governmental or private, may
peremptorily challenge a prospective juror based on race in either civil or
criminal cases.
Junling Ma
207. See Patton, supra note 13, at 935.

208. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring).
209. See Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991).
210. See id.
211. Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 2081-82 (majority opinion); see Colbert, supra note 2, at 94-98.
213. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992). Justice Blackmun delivered the Court's
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Stevens, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter. Id. at 2351. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
concurred. Id. at 2359 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia dissented. id. at 2361, (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
2364 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

